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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you are standing in a shipping container. You cannot 
sit down or move because the container is packed to the brim with as 
many people as possible. You cannot see anything as the container is 
pitch black. The smell is a horrid mix of urine, fecal matter, sweat, and 
vomit. All you can hear are people screaming, crying, and praying. You 
do not know how long you have been in there or how long you will 
stay. Finally, the door is swung open and you are blinded by the rush 
of light. Armed men grab you, blindfold you, and take you away. Your 
captors lead you to a room where they mix questions with beatings. 
Following the beatings and unsatisfied with your answers, the captors 
tie you to a spit and roast you over a grill. You are removed from the 
spit and taken to a new room. Your blindfold is removed but your 
eyesight is blurry from the tears and beatings. You can see the guards 
who are asking you questions but you cannot focus. Yet, throughout 
this horrendous ordeal you notice something out of place. A person 
standing in the corner, arms folded, simply observing. What is even 
more odd is that your captors pay this person no attention. Who is this 
person and why are they there? The mysterious person clearly is not of 
the same nationality of your captors. But who could it be? 
The situation described above is a hypothetical recounting of 
allegations raised in a June 2017 article by the Associated Press.2 The 
article alleged that the United Arab Emirates (UAE), acting in concert 
with the Government of Yemen (Yemen), have been detaining, 
abusing, and torturing numerous people in detention black sites in 
Yemen.3 The people being detained are suspected of being members 
of or having intelligence of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP) or the Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL) in the war-torn 
country of Yemen.4 The detention sites, and the individuals detained 
                                                 
 2 See Maggie Michael, In Yemen’s Secret Prisons, UAE tortures and US Interrogates, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 22, 2017), 
https://apnews.com/4925f7f0fa654853bd6f2f57174179fe. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
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there, are completely controlled by the UAE and Yemen.5 Further, the 
Associated Press article raised allegations that United States (U.S.) 
officials were aware of the abuse and torture.6 Specifically, the article 
alleged that U.S. officials were providing the UAE with questions, 
sitting in on torture sessions, interrogating detainees after torture 
sessions, and acting on intelligence gathered from the torture sessions.7 
However, the article explicitly states that U.S. officials never abused or 
tortured anyone, only that they were complicit in and had knowledge 
of the abuse and torture.8 The U.S. quickly denounced the allegations, 
stating that while “American forces do participate in interrogations of 
detainees at locations in Yemen, provide questions for others to ask, 
and receive transcripts of interrogations from Emirati allies,” there is 
no evidence to suggest that any of the alleged abuse or torture has 
occurred in the presence of U.S. forces.9 
These allegations raise questions regarding international and 
domestic law. Torture is illegal and if the allegations are true, Yemen 
and the UAE would be in breach of international humanitarian and 
human rights law.10 Moreover, the issues of rendition, extraordinary 
                                                 
 5 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Yemen: UAE Backs Abusive Local Forces, HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH (June 22, 2017, 1:25 AM), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/22/yemen-uae-backs-abusive-local-forces. 
 6 See Michael, supra note 2. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 See Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter 
Geneva Convention II]; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]; Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Aug. 6, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 
3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
international Armed Conflicts, Aug. 6, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter 
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rendition, and proxy detention in relation to detainee abuse and torture 
have been thoroughly examined by legal scholars.11 However, this is 
not a case of proxy detention in relation to rendition. According to the 
article, the detention sites and the detainees in them are financed and 
run by Yemen and the UAE.12 If the United States knew about the 
abuse and torture and did nothing, that would certainly make it 
complicit, but would it be in violation of international humanitarian 
law (IHL)? Would it be a violation of domestic law? In a jus in bello13 
custodial situation where abuse and torture have occurred, what degree 
of complicity or control would the United States need to exert over 
the situation to be found in violation of these different legal 
paradigms? This comment will argue that the United States’ mere 
knowledge of another state’s abuse or torture, with which it does not 
participate in or have any degree of control over, does not constitute a 
violation of international humanitarian law. Additionally, under the 
same circumstances, U.S. officials would also not be in violation of 
domestic statutes. 
To fully understand the nature of the allegations and the 
applicable international law, a history of the Yemen Civil War is 
illustrative. Section I of this comment will explain the nature and 
history of this conflict, the relevant actors, and the role of the United 
States in Yemen and its Civil War. With the conflict established, 
Section II will provide an in-depth analysis of the applicable domestic 
and international laws in relation to the conflict and allegations. To 
fully understand the applicable law, jus in bello must be examined. 
Further, working definitions of torture, command and control, 
complicity, proxy detention, and joint venture will be established. With 
the conflict understood and the legal parameters set forth, Section III 
will then posit that, under the facts set forth, the United States could 
                                                 
Additional Protocol II]; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
 11 See generally David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition 
and the Torture Convention, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 585 (2006), for a discussion of 
extraordinary rendition and torture as it relates to detention. 
 12 See Michael, supra note 2. 
 13 Jus in bello translated means “right in war.” Today, it is synonymous with 
the terms international humanitarian law, the law of armed conflict, and the law of 
war. See STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 254 (6th ed. 2016). 
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not be found to be in violation of domestic or international law. 
Section IV will conclude this comment by addressing policy 
recommendations moving forward for the United States in its national 
security endeavors. 
I. THE YEMEN CIVIL WAR 
A. History 
The current situation in Yemen is rife with conflict and 
complexity. The country is being torn apart by warring political 
factions, competing militias, foreign intervention, economic collapse, 
and a staggering humanitarian crisis. This conflict is deeply rooted and 
ultimately stems from the unification of Yemen in 1990.14 Prior to 
1990, the Nation of Yemen was divided by the northern government 
of Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and the southern government of the 
People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY).15 Ali Abdullah 
Saleh (Saleh), YAR’s Secretary General, was working in concert with 
PDRY’s Secretary General to unify the country.16 Saleh then assumed 
leadership as Yemen’s first president under the unification.17 However, 
this new alliance between the northern and southern regions, which 
had stark sectarian and political differences, was more illusory than 
anything.18 In 1992, an organization called the Believing Youth was 
                                                 
 14 See generally G.A. Res. 45/193 (Dec. 21, 1990) (recognizing internationally 
the unified, sovereign state of Yemen). See also Noel Brehony, Yemen and the Huthis: 
Genesis of the 2015 Crisis, 46 ASIAN AFF. 232, 233 (2015); Adam Baron et al., Mapping 
the Yemen Conflict, EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 
http://www.ecfr.eu/mena/yemen (last visited Oct. 8, 2017). 
 15 See Zachary Laub, Yemen in Crisis, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis (last updated Apr. 19, 2016). 
 16 PDRY’s General Secretary, Ali Salim al-Baydh, assumed the role of vice-
president under the newly unified Yemeni government. See Mahjoob Zweiri, Iran and 
Political Dynamism in the Arab World: The Case of Yemen, in THE MIDDLE EAST: NEW 
WORLD ORDER OR DISORDER? 153, 163 (Mohammed M. Aman & Mary Jo Aman, 
MLIS eds., 2016). 
 17 Id. 
 18 See id.; The former PDRY was a communist led party with close ties to 
the USSR, while the former YAR was a republican government comprised of tribal 
representation. Gabriel Jonsson, TOWARDS KOREAN RECONCILIATION: SOCIO-
CULTURAL EXCHANGES AND COOPERATION, 38-42 (Ashgate Publ’g 2006). 
2019 It's Dark and Hell is Hot 7:2 
451 
formed by Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi.19 This organization evolved 
into the modern-day Houthi organization.20 
The first decade of a unified Yemen was anything but peaceful; 
in 1994, Yemen endured its first Civil War after unification.21 By 
quickly pacifying attempts by Southern Yemenis at secession, 
President Saleh established Northern hegemony over the entirety of 
the country.22 In 2004, the Houthi movement began their insurgency 
against the Saleh regime.23 The Houthi movement was far less violent 
than the movements led by other factions in Yemen at this time such 
as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).24 Nonetheless, Saleh’s 
response was merciless and eventually led to the assassination of the 
Houthi’s leader, Hussein Al-Houthi.25 After his death, the Houthis 
fought on and off with the government until 2010.26 In an effort to 
gain international support, specifically from Saudi Arabia and the 
United States, President Saleh began accusing Iran of supporting the 
Houthis.27 While these claims were unsubstantiated, Saleh’s tactic 
proved successful as Saudi Arabia took notice of the growing Houthi 
movement situated along the Yemeni-Saudi border.28 Thereafter, in 
                                                 
 19 See Zweiri, supra note 16, at 161. Al-Houthi, a pragmatic and idealistic 
leader, established the organization as an Islamic Zaydi Shi’a religious response as to 
what he saw was the spread of the Saudi inspired Salafi sect of Islam in Northwest 
Yemen. See also Brehony, supra note 14, at 237. 
 20 See Zweiri, supra note 16. 
 21 See Farea Al-Muslimi, The Southern Question: Yemen’s War Inside the War, 
CARNEGIE MIDDLE EAST CENTER (July 8, 2015), http://carnegie-
mec.org/diwan/60627?lang=en. The conflict broke out due to the attempted 
secession of the former DPRY over political and economic grievances. See id. 
 22 See id. 
 23 See Profile: Yemen’s Houthi Fighters, ALJAZEERA (Aug. 12, 2009), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2009/08/200981294214604934.htm
l. 
 24 See generally Thomas Juneau, Iran’s Policy Towards the Houthis in Yemen: A 
Limited Return on a Modest Investment, 92 INT’L AFF. 647 (2016). 
 25 Id. at 651. See also ALJAZEERA, supra note 23. Saleh had placed a $55,000 
bounty on Al-Houthi prior to his death. Id. 
 26 See Juneau, supra note 24, at 652. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
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2009, Saudi Arabia began a military campaign aimed at Houthi targets 
amidst growing concern over the conflict in Yemen.29 
In 2011, President Saleh’s power began to wane.30 Meanwhile, 
the Arab Spring movement gained momentum from which Yemen 
was not immune.31 As the country’s population began to protest the 
Saleh regime, it became clear that Saleh would have to step down from 
the Presidency.32 The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) feared a de-
stabilized Yemen and sought to secure a peaceful transfer of power.33 
Finally, in March 2012, in coordination with the United Nations and 
Saleh, the GCC secured the departure of Saleh and the installation of 
his replacement, then Vice-President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi 
(Hadi).34 
Hadi is a southerner from the Abyan Governorate,35 selected 
as Saleh’s successor as an attempt to appease the regional differences 
in the country.36 However, Hadi had sided with the Saleh government 
in 1994, so his appointment did little to appease the secessionists or 
the Houthis.37 Saleh, after obtaining immunity from prosecution as 
                                                 
 29 Id. Saudi Arabia also established a naval blockade near Northeast Yemen 
in an attempt to stem the flow of material support the Houthis were receiving from 
Iran. Id. 
 30 See id. 
 31 Id. See generally Brian M. Perkins, Yemen: Between Revolution and Regression, 40 
STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM, 300 (2016). 
 32 See William A. Rugh, Problems in Yemen, Domestic and Foreign, 22 MIDDLE 
EAST POL’Y 140, 145 (2015). 
 33 The Gulf Cooperation Council is a collection of Middle-Eastern States 
including the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain. See Robert Forster, The 
Southern Transitional Council: Implications for Yemen’s Peace Process, 24 MIDDLE EAST 
POL’Y 133, 134 (2017). It is led by Saudi Arabia, and supported by the United States. 
Id. See generally Agreement on the Implementation Mechanism for the Transition 
Process in Yemen in Accordance with the Initiative of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC), Yemen (May 12, 2011), 
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/YE_111205_Agreement
%20on%20the%20implementation%20mechanism%20for%20the%20transition.pd
f. 
 34 See Rugh, supra note 32. See also Al-Muslimi, supra note 21. 
 35 See Al-Muslimi, supra note 21. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
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part of his step down from power, was not interested in going quiet 
into the night.38 While not only securing immunity from prosecution, 
Saleh was also allowed to remain as the head of his political party.39 In 
essence, this ensured that Saleh would remain a key player in Yemen’s 
conflict as he retained a strong loyalty from a large portion of the 
military, security services, bureaucracy, and tribal militias.40 In addition 
to the transition from Saleh to Hadi, the deal brokered by the GCC 
established a National Dialogue Conference (NDC) to construct a new 
constitution.41 
Opportunistically, the Houthis capitalized on the political 
turmoil in the country and the Arab Spring. Taking part in many of the 
street protest, the Houthis began to consolidate their political and 
military power.42 Additionally, the Houthis participated in the national 
dialogue, albeit, their participation was very limited as they were very 
suspicious of the country’s political elite.43 The initial breakdown of 
the transition process can be attributed to two reasons: first, the 
political discussion did little to radically alter the current institutions, it 
simply perpetuated old problems; and second, the proposed federalism 
plan would have divided the Houthi’s areas of control.44 With the 
growing frustration in the lack of progress in the NDC and a loss of 
patience with President Hadi, the Houthis tribal militias began to 
maneuver south.45 Through intense fighting, the Houthis reached the 
capital city of Sanaa in 2014 where they secured large portions of the 
city.46 
The Houthis did not make these gains alone. The Houthis were 
able to ally with former President Saleh, a catalyst to the advancement 
of their political and military goals.47 Additionally, the Houthis received 
                                                 
 38 See Juneau, supra note 24, at 653. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 See Rugh, supra note 32, at 145. 
 42 See Perkins, supra note 31, at 311. 
 43 See Rugh, supra note 32. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 146. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
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humanitarian aid and vocal support for their movement from Iran.48 
With Saleh’s support (and possibly Iran’s as well), the Houthis 
eventually took control of Sanaa, forcing Hadi to resign the presidency 
and flee to Aden.49 However, once Hadi was safe in Aden, and with 
the full support of the UN Security Council, he declared that he was 
still President of Yemen.50 With full international support of his 
legitimacy, Hadi called on the GCC to intervene in the conflict 
militarily.51 On March 26, 2015, Saudi Arabia began conducting air 
strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen.52 Additionally, the Saudi 
Government was able to obtain support from several other countries.53 
The Saudi-led coalition quickly realized the air strikes were not 
debilitating or even containing the Houthi advance.54 In July 2015, 
Saudi and Emirati ground troops were deployed in Aden and reclaimed 
the city.55 The Saudi coalition troops, however, were stalled against 
fierce fighting.56 The conflict continues today, and as the fighting 
increases and losses are inflicted, both the Houthis and the Yemen 
Government, along with their respective allies, become even more 
entrenched in their views. 
B. U.S. Role, Al-Qaeda, & ISIL 
While the September 11, 2001 terror attacks are generally seen 
as the start of the United States’ Global War on Terror, the attack 
against the USS Cole in October of 2000 was the start of the United 
States taking a more proactive approach in Yemen.57 Al-Qaeda, the 
international terror group responsible for both attacks, quickly became 
                                                 
 48 See id. However, Iran’s role in supporting the Houthi movement is not as 
overstated as Saudi Arabia believes. insert citation. See Juneau, supra note 24, at 655. 
 49 See Rugh, supra note 32, at 146. 
 50 Id. See also S.C. Res. 2216, ¶ 8 (Apr. 14, 2015). 
 51 See Rugh, supra note 32, at 147. 
 52 Id. 
 53 This included the GCC countries, U.S., France, Great Britain, Turkey, and 
Belgium. Id. 
 54 Id. at 148. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 See CNN Library, USS Cole Bombing Fast Facts, CNN, 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/18/world/meast/uss-cole-bombing-fast-
facts/index.html (last updated Jan. 7, 2019); See also Laub, supra note 15. 
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the United States’ supreme enemy. Even though the United States’ 
efforts in the region have predominantly been in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
Yemen has seen numerous U.S. counterterror operations ranging from 
commando raids to drone strikes.58 Along with AQAP, the U.S. has 
struggled with the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIL). Like Al-Qaeda, ISIL has spread beyond its traditional area of 
operation and established operational cells in Yemen.59 Add these 
insurgent groups to the already volatile and delicate situation in 
Yemen, and the conflict becomes even more convoluted. 
The terrorist group known as Al-Qaeda, formed as an offshoot 
of the Afghanistan Mujahideen shortly after the Russian-Afghanistan 
War.60 During the 1990s, Al-Qaeda, translated as “the base,” turned its 
focus towards global jihad and began conducting terror attacks across 
the globe.61 Following 9/11 and the global recognition the attacks gave 
the group, subsidiary insurgencies became established in many 
countries, including Yemen.62 Even though these offshoots, like Al-
Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), received much of the media attention due to the 
Iraq and Afghan Wars, AQAP was no less lethal or active.63 Due to the 
fact that the government of Yemen never had a security monopoly in 
its territory, AQAP has been able to take full advantage of the political 
and security vacuum in Yemen.64 The current Civil War has permitted 
AQAP to consolidate and expand, gaining control of large swaths of 
territory in southern Yemen.65 In addition to carrying out attacks in 
Yemen and Saudi Arabia, AQAP claimed responsibility for both the 
suicide bombing in 2008 against the U.S. embassy in Yemen and the 
                                                 
 58 See Richard Sisk, US Troops on Ground in Yemen Against AQAP Terror Group, 
MILITARY.COM, http://www.military.com/daily-news/2017/08/04/us-troops-
ground-yemen-aqap-terror-group.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2019). 
 59 See Jeremy M. Sharp, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV. 10, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43960.pdf (last updated 
Aug. 24, 2018). 
 60 See Ty McCormick, Al Qaeda Core: A Short History, FOREIGN POLICY (Mar. 
17, 2014, 5:17 PM), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/17/al-qaeda-core-a-short-history/. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 See Perkins, supra note 31, at 313. 
 65 Id. 
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2015 Charlie Hedbo attacks.66 U.S. forces have been conducting military 
operations in the form of drone strikes and intelligence operations 
against AQAP since Congress passed an Authorization for Use of 
Military Force (AUMF) shortly after 9/11.67 While the use of drone 
strikes in Yemen has been a contentious topic, both from a human 
rights and legal standpoint, the United States has seen some success 
against AQAP.68 
Similar to AQAP, ISIL in Yemen (ISIL-Y), has taken 
advantage of the power vacuum in Yemen.69 ISIL, primarily based out 
of Syria, debuted on the international terrorism stage in 2014 when the 
group posted a video online showing the beheading of an American 
journalist.70 In a short time, ISIL took territory in Iraq and Syria, 
surprising the international community with how easily they defeated 
the Iraqi military.71 As the group continued to gain territory and 
publicity, their human rights violations and violent tactics became 
more widespread.72 Similar to Al-Qaeda, as ISIL gained international 
notoriety, the group began to establish offshoot organizations in 
Middle-Eastern countries, including Yemen.73 Although ISIL-Y does 
not have as significant a presence in Yemen and does not control large 
amounts of territory there, the group is just as active and is arguably 
more violent than AQAP.74 Although, in 2016, ISIL-Y “publicly 
                                                 
 66 See Rugh, supra note 32, at 144. 
 67 Id. 
 68 See generally Tony Nasser, Modern War Crimes by the United States: Do Drone 
Strikes Violate International Law? Questioning the Legality of U.S. Drone Strikes and 
Analyzing the United States’ Response to International Reproach Based on the Realism Theory of 
International Relations, 24. S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 289 (2014) (discussing the legality 
of the U.S. use of drone strikes). 
 69 See e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2016 
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA (2016), 
https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2016/272232.htm. 
 70 See ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA, ISLAMIC STATE IN IRAQ AND THE 
LEVANT, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Islamic-State-in-Iraq-and-the-Levant (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2017). 
 71 See id. 
 72 See id. 
 73 See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, supra note 69. 
 74 Id. 
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disagree[d] with the group’s leadership regarding its tactics . . . 
indicating a large rift within the group.”75 
The United States policy concerning Yemen, while nuanced, is 
essentially two-fold: 1) support the recognized government of Yemen 
and President Hadi by assisting the Saudi-led coalition; and 2) conduct 
counterterror operations against AQAP and ISIL.76 These policy goals 
are not mutually exclusive and often overlap. During the early 2000’s, 
the Bush administration worked with Saleh to combat AQAP fighters 
in Yemen.77 This support came in the form of economic and military 
aid as well intelligence assistance.78 Saleh allowed the United States to 
conduct air strikes in Yemen against AQAP.79 However, the United 
States government did not completely trust Saleh because it thought 
that he was feeding it targets that were his political opponents as well 
as suspected AQAP members.80 This manipulation frustrated the U.S. 
because a number of subsequent U.S. drone strikes inadvertently killed 
civilians.81 In these days, the policy of supporting the government and 
combating terrorists essentially were one in the same.82 However, after 
the Arab Spring and the onset of Yemen’s current civil war, the policies 
have become bifurcated.83 While these policies are distinct from one 
another, they are not contradictory and indeed reinforce each other. 
Combatting AQAP and ISIL-Y in the region supports the Saudi led 
coalition by helping to restore the authority of the government. On the 
                                                 
 75 Id. 
 76 See Sharp, supra note 59, at 21, 23. 
 77 See Rugh, supra note 32, at 144. 
 78 See Data: U.S. Security Aid to Yemen, SECURITY ASSISTANCE MONITOR, 
https://www.securityassistance.org/data/program/military/Yemen/2000/2018/all
/Middle%20East// (last visited Oct. 28, 2017) [hereinafter “Data, SECURITY 
ASSISTANCE MONITOR”]; Yemen Foreign Assistance, FOREIGNASSISTANCE.GOV, 
https://foreignassistance.gov/explore/country/Yemen (last visited Oct. 28, 2017); 
Rugh, supra note 32, at 144. 
 79 See Rugh, supra note 32, at 144. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 See Bruce Riedel, A Brief History of America’s Troubled Relationship with Yemen, 
LAWFARE (Oct. 30, 2018, 7:52 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/brief-history-
americas-troubled-relationship-yemen. 
 83 Id. 
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other hand, supporting the coalition in reestablishing control over the 
country will only help in the fight against AQAP and ISIL-Y. 
The United States has not ceased counterterror operations in 
Yemen since the U.S. began such operations shortly after 9/11.84 
Additionally, the amount and type of support the United States has 
given Yemen since the breakdown of the government and the onset of 
the conflict has fluctuated.85 Since 2015, the United States has not 
given Yemen any security aid and has even closed its embassy due to 
the fighting.86 The assistance the U.S. lends to the Saudi-led coalition 
comes in the form of financial support, weapons sales, and 
coordination on intelligence matters.87 By coordinating on intelligence 
matters with the Saudi-led forces in Yemen, the U.S. can more 
effectively fight AQAP and ISIL-Y.88 Additionally, continuing the fight 
against AQAP and ISIL-Y only helps facilitate the Saudi-led coalition 
in its efforts to re-establish the government in Yemen.89 While the U.S. 
military operations in and around Yemen focus on AQAP and ISIL, 
the U.S. has employed force against the Houthis as a measure of self-
defense.90 
C. Detainee Abuse & Torture 
A recently published article alleges that Yemeni and UAE 
troops had established numerous secret detention facilities, or black 
sites, in Southern Yemen.91 The article alleges that in these black sites, 
UAE and Yemeni forces are holding people suspected of being AQAP 
                                                 
 84 See Yemen: Reported U.S. Covert Actions 2001-2011, THE BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/drone-
war/data/yemen-reported-us-covert-actions-2001-2011 (last visited Oct. 28, 2017). 
 85 See Data, SECURITY ASSISTANCE MONITOR, supra note 78. 
 86 See Rugh, supra note 32, at 150. 
 87 Daniel Brown, U.S. Maintains Support of Saudi-led Coalition in Yemen War 
Even as NATO Allies Stop Selling Weapons, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 25, 2018, 3:26 PM), 
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/us-maintains-support-of-saudi-led-
coalition-in-yemen-war-even-as-nato-allies-stop-selling-weapons/ar-AAvaRyK. 
 88 See Clare Duncan, The Conflict in Yemen: A Primer, LAWFARE (Nov. 28, 
2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/conflict-yemen-primer. 
 89 Id. 
 90 See Sharp, supra note 59, at 11-14. 
 91 See Michael, supra note 2. 
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or ISIL-Y members.92 Further, the captors are subjecting the black 
site’s detainees to abuse and even torture.93 The author interviewed a 
number of people who claimed they were subjected to such abuse and 
torture.94 Additionally, the article contains allegations that U.S. officials 
knew about the abuse and torture.95 According to the article, not only 
did the United States know about the abuse and torture, but the United 
States also gave questions to UAE and Yemeni officials, sat in on 
torture sessions, interrogated suspects after they had been tortured, 
and acted upon intelligence gathered during torture sessions.96 U.S. 
officials acknowledged their coordination and participation with UAE 
and detention officials, but denied that any abuse or torture had taken 
place.97 U.S. officials stated they were aware of the allegations, looked 
into them, and were satisfied that no human rights violations took 
place.98 Chief Defense Department spokeswoman Dana White stated 
that, “[w]e always adhere to the highest standards of personal and 
professional conduct. . . . We would not turn a blind eye, because we 
are obligated to report any violations of human rights.”99 It is worthy 
to note that the article does not allege that U.S. officials were in control 
or command of the detention sites or detainees. 
After the flurry of news reports that arose from these 
allegations, there have been no follow up reports. The United States 
Senate called for an investigation into the matter.100 The Yemeni 
Government also started an investigation.101 However, there has been 
no news on whether any of these investigations have been followed 
                                                 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Desmond Butler & Maggie Michael, Senators Ask Military to Clarify U.S. 
Role in Yemen Torture Sites, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (June 23, 2017, 6:08 PM), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-senate-yemen-torture-
reports-20170623-story.html. 
 101 Yemen Orders Probe into Alleged Torture by UAE, ALJAZEERA (June 24, 
2017), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/yemen-orders-probe-alleged-
torture-uae-170624160933567.html. 
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through with. UAE government officials stated that the witnesses 
interviewed for the report fabricated the stories as a public relations 
tactic paid for by the Houthis, AQAP, or ISIL-Y against the UAE and 
the U.S.102 
II. DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL DETENTION, ABUSE, AND 
TORTURE LAWS 
A. United States’ Legal Authority 
“Security against foreign danger is one of the primitive objects 
of civil society.”103 Yet, the power of administering America’s security 
against foreign danger is not monopolized in the federal 
government.104 Through the constitutionally delegated authorities, 
checks, and balances, the triumvirate branches of the federal 
government each play a unique role in America’s security. The United 
States Constitution delegates authority to Congress to “declare war . . . 
and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.”105 
Additionally, Congress has the authority to “raise and support 
Armies,”106 “provide and maintain a Navy,”107 and “make Rules for the 
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”108 
Congressional “war powers,” apart from the power to declare war, are 
rarely considered in isolation.109 In sum, when it comes to military 
capture and detention, Congress promulgates such rules as it deems 
                                                 
 102 Id. 
 103 THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison), THE AVALON PROJECT, 
YALE LAW SCHOOL, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed41.asp (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2019). 
 104 See generally U.S. CONST. art. I; id. art. II. 
 105 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 106 Id. cl. 12. 
 107 Id.cl. 13. 
 108 Id.cl. 14. 
 109 United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263–64 (1967) (explaining that “the 
phrase ‘war power’ cannot be invoked as a talismanic incantation to support any 
exercise of congressional power which can be brought within its ambit”). 
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necessary.110 Finally, the Senate has the authority to ratify treaties that 
are established by the President.111 
The Constitution vests the President with the power of the 
“Commander in Chief” over the nation’s armed services; however, this 
power has its limits.112 The framer’s intended that the Commander in 
Chief “would amount to nothing more than the supreme command 
and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and 
admiral. . . .”113 Where Congress has not promulgated legislation in 
regard to military detention, the President is presumed to have 
Constitutional authority as Commander in Chief to determine the 
conduct of the military and intelligence community.114 
Congress has enacted a number of statutes that authorize and 
regulate military detention. The most notable statute in relation to 
military detention today is the Authorization for Use of Military 
Force.115 Since shortly after 9/11 and the advent of the Global War on 
Terror, the President has relied on the AUMF as the basis for U.S. 
                                                 
 110 ”‘[A]dministrative detention’ or ‘preventative detention,’” are used to 
denote the term “[s]ecurity detention,” which is a form of military detention that will 
be defined in this article as “the deprivation of liberty, without criminal charges, of a 
protected person, ordered by the executive branch, for security reasons during 
international or noninternational armed conflicts, or other situations of violence.” 
GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW IN WAR 818, 820 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 2016) (2010) (citing Jelena Pejic, 
Procedural Principles and Safeguards for Internment/Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict 
and Other Situations of Violence, 87/858 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS (June 2005), 
375). 
 111 See U.S. CONST. art II, § 2. 
 112 Id. cl. 1-2. 
 113 THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton), THE AVALON PROJECT, 
YALE LAW SCHOOL, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed41.asp (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2019). 
 114 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (stating that “in absence of either a congressional grant or 
denial of authority,” the President may “only rely upon on his own independent 
powers . . . “). 
 115 Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. (2001) 
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domestic legal authority regarding military operations, including 
detention.116 It states: 
That the President is authorized to use all necessary 
and appropriate force against those nations, 
organizations, or persons he determines planned, 
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks 
that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such 
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any 
future acts of international terrorism against the United 
States by such nations, organizations or persons.117 
It should be noted that there is a lack of any geographic scope 
mentioned in the joint resolution. Even though the AUMF does not 
explicitly mention a group or person by name, the AUMF generally 
implicates Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and any 9/11 conspirators.118 Also, 
the AUMF lacks a temporal limit, which implicitly gives the President 
Congressional authorization to use force against these groups so long 
as Congress does not revoke the authority. Additionally, the language 
“all necessary and appropriate force” gives the President considerable 
discretion in carrying out military operations.119 
While the AUMF is silent in regard to detention, the authority 
to carry out military operations incorporates the authority to detain in 
relation to those operations.120 In interpreting the President’s military 
detention authority, federal courts have relied on the AUMF as the 
statutory grounds for individuals who were detained as a result of 
military operations conducted under the AUMF.121 However, the 
                                                 
 116 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004). 
 117 See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 
224, 224 § 2(a) (2001). 
 118 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 507, 518. 
 119 Id. at 518. 
 120 See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28–29 (1942) (“An important incident to 
the conduct of war is the adoption of measures by the military command . . . to seize 
and subject to disciplinary measures those enemies who . . . have violated the law of 
war.”). See also Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518. 
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AUMF is not the only piece of legislation that covers military detention 
regulations and procedures.  
Following the United Nations adoption of the Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
and Other Cruel and Inhuman Punishment (“Convention Against 
Torture” or “CAT”), the U.S. became a party to the CAT only after 
the Senate gave advice and consent subject to the reservations, 
declarations, and understandings.122 An important section of the 
reservations put forth by Congress was Section II(b), which states that 
“the United States understands that the definition of torture in Article 
1 is intended to apply only to acts directed against persons in the 
offender’s custody or physical control.”123 Entering into the CAT was 
not intended to be “self-executing.”124 Therefore, Congress passed the 
Torture Convention Implementation Act (Torture Act) to implement 
Articles 4 and 5 of the CAT in American domestic law.125 
The Torture Act defines torture as “an act committed by a 
person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict 
severe physical or mental pain or suffering . . . upon another person 
within his custody or physical control. . . .”126 Likewise, the Torture 
Act defines “severe mental pain or suffering” as: 
[T]he prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting 
from-- (A) the intentional infliction or threatened 
infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; (B) the 
administration or application, or threatened 
administration or application, of mind-altering 
substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt 
                                                 
and appropriate force’ Congress has authorized the President to use.” Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 518. 
 122 See U.S. v. Emmanuel, No. 06-20758-CR, 2007 WL 2002452, at *1–*2 
(S.D. Fla. 2007). 
 123 U.S. RESERVATIONS, DECLARATIONS, AND UNDERSTANDINGS, 
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING 
TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, § II(b), CONG. REC. S17486-01 (daily ed., Oct. 27, 
1990). 
 124 Emmanuel, 2007 WL 2002452, at *2 n.2. 
 125 Id. at *3. 
 126 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1). 
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profoundly the senses or the personality; (C) the threat 
of imminent death; or (D) the threat that another 
person will imminently be subjected to death, severe 
physical pain or suffering, or the administration or 
application of mind-altering substances or other 
procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses 
or personality.127 
The Torture Act includes a specific intent requirement that is 
not found in the CAT’s definition of torture.128 Additionally, the 
Torture Act does not include criminal sanctions for cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment or punishment.129 
In addition to the Torture Act, Congress passed the War 
Crimes Act (WCA), the purpose of which is to provide criminal 
sanctions for members of the Armed Forces or nationals of the United 
States who commit “war crimes” that constitute a “grave breach” of 
the Geneva Conventions.130 Utilizing the “grave breach” definition 
supplied by the Geneva Conventions, the WCA makes it illegal for U.S. 
military personnel or officials to engage in torture, cruel treatment, and 
outrages upon personal dignity.131 The definition of torture in the 
WCA is the exact same as the one provided in the Torture Act except 
that it adds the language, “for the purpose of obtaining information or 
a confession, punishment, intimidation, coercion, or any reason based 
on discrimination of any kind.”132 The WCA also defines cruel or 
inhuman treatment as “[t]he act of a person who commits, or conspires 
or attempts to commit, an act intended to inflict severe or serious 
physical or mental pain or suffering . . . including serious physical 
abuse, upon another within his custody or control.”133 
In 2005, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) 
which prohibits the “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
                                                 
 127 Id. at § 2340(2). 
 128 Id. at § 2340(2)(A). 
 129 See id. 
 130 War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2441(a)–(c). 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. at § (d)(1)(A). 
 133 Id. at § (d)(1)(B). 
2019 It's Dark and Hell is Hot 7:2 
465 
punishment” of persons under “the custody or under the physical 
control of the United States Government. . . .”134 The DTA states that 
“[n]o individual in the custody or under the physical control of the 
United States Government, regardless of nationality or physical 
location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment.”135 This language is clear in that it is irrelevant where the 
detainee is held or what extension of the government is executing that 
detention. While there is serious debate over what type of acts 
constitutes “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment,” 
Congress defined it as acts “prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United 
States. . . .”136 Also, the DTA forbids U.S. personnel from engaging in 
interrogation techniques that are not stated in the U.S. Army’s Field 
Manual.137 
Congress provided guidance as to what class of persons may 
be lawfully subject to military commissions, including detainment, 
under the AUMF when it passed the Military Commissions Act of 
2006 (MCA).138 Furthermore, the MCA amended the WCA in a 
number of ways relating to detention, abuse, and torture: first, the 
MCA narrowed the offense from a “violation” to “a grave breach” of 
the Geneva Conventions.139 Next, the definition of torture and “cruel 
or inhuman treatment” were amended to the language noted above.140 
                                                 
 134 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd(a). 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. at § 2000dd(d). 
 137 See Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739 § 1002(a). 
 138 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub L. No. 109–366, 120 Stat. 2600, 
2601. (defining “‘unlawful enemy combatant’” as “(i) a person who has engaged in 
hostilities or who has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the 
United States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant (including 
a person who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces)” and “‘lawful 
enemy combatant’” as “(A) a member of the regular forces of a State party engaged 
in hostilities against the United States; “(B) a member of a militia, volunteer corps, 
or organized resistance movement belonging to a State party engaged in such 
hostilities, which are under responsible command, wear a fixed distinctive sign 
recognizable at a distance, carry their arms openly, and abide by the law of war; or 
“(C) a member of a regular armed force who professes allegiance to a government 
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 139 Id. § 6(a)–(b), 120 Stat. 2632–33. 
 140 Id. at § 6(b), 120 Stat. 2633. 
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Additionally, as a result of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, the MCA amended the DTA by striping federal courts of 
their ability to hear habeas petitions filed by detained aliens.141 
Another source of detention law originates from the Executive 
Branch. In 2009, President Barack Obama signed Executive Order 
(E.O.) 13,491, which revoked Executive Order 13,340.142 E.O. 13,491 
set minimum standards and practices for individuals in the custody of 
the U.S. that went above and beyond the Torture Act, WCA, and 
DTA.143 The E.O. reiterated that interrogation techniques and 
detention practices only applied to individuals in “the custody or under 
the effective control” of the U.S. or detained in a “facility owned, 
operated, or controlled” by the U.S.144 A significant effect of the E.O. 
was that all U.S. personnel were now bound by law to only use the 
interrogation techniques set forth in Army Field Manual 2-22.3.145 
In addition to the aforementioned authorities, Congress has 
enacted a number of federal civil causes of action in regard to torture. 
These include the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), the Torture Victims 
Protection Act (TVPA), and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The 
Alien Tort Statute (ATS) codifies aspects of customary international 
law against aliens, and provides that “[t]he district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.”146 Originally enacted by the first Congress in 1789, the 
Supreme Court has been careful about how it interprets international 
norms and how to implement international norms into federal 
common law.147 In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court held that 
                                                 
 141 Id. at § 7(a), 120 stat. 2635–36 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1)) (“No 
court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a 
writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United States 
who has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an 
enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.”). 
 142 See DYCUS, supra note 13, at 1041. 
 143 Exec. Order No. 13,491, Ensuring Lawful Interrogations, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893, 
4894 (Jan. 22, 2009). 
 144 Id. 
 145 See id. 
 146 Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
 147 See DYCUS, supra note 13, at 205. 
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Congress originally “intended the ATS to furnish jurisdiction for a 
relatively modest set of actions alleging violations of the law of 
nations.”148 This “modest set” of claims included “violation of safe 
conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.”149 
The Court, however, did not suggest that it would not recognize new 
claims for torts in violation of the international law; it held that any 
such claim would have to “rest on a norm of international character 
accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity 
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms. . . .”150 
The TVPA was enacted by Congress in response to the 
ratification of the CAT.151 This civil cause of action provides a remedy 
for the victims of torture, but only torture or “extrajudicial killing[s]” 
under the “actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign 
nation.”152 Congress passed the TVPA “in part to fulfill the 
Convention’s mandate that ratifying nations take action to ensure that 
torturers are held legally accountable for their actions.”153 In Arar v. 
Ashcroft, respondent brought a TVPA claim against several U.S. 
officials for his alleged rendition to Syria where he was interrogated 
under torture by Syrian authorities.154 The Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that the respondent failed to state a claim under the 
TVPA against various U.S. officials because the respondent alleged 
that the officials were acting under the color of federal law, and not 
foreign law.155 Additionally, the court held that the U.S. officials would 
have to be acting, or “possessed power under Syrian law, and that the 
offending actions . . . derived from an exercise of that power. . . .”156 
“Courts may not entertain suits against the United States 
without [the] consent of the United States in the form of an express 
                                                 
 148 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 720 (2004). 
 149 Id. at 720, 724. 
 150 Id. at 725. 
 151 See DYCUS, supra note 13, at 198. 
 152 Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § (2)(a), 106 Stat. 
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 153 Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 92 (D.C. Cir. 
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waiver of sovereign immunity.”157 Therefore, “[t]he United States is 
liable only to the extent it waives sovereign immunity. . . .”158 The 
FTCA sets the limitations and procedures for causes of actions against 
the United States government and its officials for civil liability.159 
However, the U.S. does not waive its immunity if the tort arises from 
the exercise of discretionary functions, combatant activities of the 
military during time of war, activity incident to military service, 
intentional torts, or for any claims arising in a foreign country.160 If a 
person were to bring an FTCA claim against the U.S. government or 
its personnel for torture while being detained by the U.S., that person 
would have to exhaust all administrative remedies available to them 
before doing so.161 Furthermore, it would be difficult for a claimant to 
have a colorable FTCA claim because of the difficulty of proving that 
a U.S. official, either military or civilian, was acting outside the scope 
of their employment during an interrogation session(s) that included 
abuse or torture.162 
Another set of statutes that deserves to be mentioned are the 
Leahy amendments. The Leahy amendments are located in two 
different places in the U.S. Code: the first is a recurring provision in 
Department of Defense (DoD) appropriations bill,163 and the second 
is in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA).164 Although similar, 
the provisions are not identical. The Leahy amendments prohibits the 
DoD from providing “training, equipment, or other assistance for a 
unit of a foreign security force” if the DoD has “credible information 
that [such] unit [is] committ[ing] a gross violation of human rights.”165 
Additionally, the Secretary of Defense is required to consult with the 
                                                 
 157 Jayvee Brand, Inc. v. U.S., 721 F.2d 385, 388 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 158 Owen v. U.S., 935 F.2d 734, 736 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 159 See Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–2680 (2012). 
 160 Id. at § 2680. 
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 162 See generally In re Iraq & Afghanistan Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85 
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Secretary of State prior the decision to assist a foreign security unit.166 
However, the statute contains certain exceptions to the prohibition 
including that the “government of such country has taken all necessary 
corrective steps” or disaster or humanitarian relief.167 Furthermore, the 
Secretary of Defense may waive the prohibition if “extraordinary 
circumstances” permit.168 If the Secretary of Defense does apply the 
exception or waive the prohibition, the Secretary is required to report 
such exceptions or waivers to the appropriate Congressional 
Committees not later than fifteen days from application of the 
exception.169 
The FAA Leahy amendment pertains to the prohibition of 
assistance under the FAA or the Arms Export Control Act to “any 
unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State 
has credible information that such unit has committed a gross violation 
of human rights.”170 Similar to the DoD version, the Secretary of State 
may make an exception if the government of the country takes 
“effective steps to bring the responsible members of the security forces 
unit to justice.”171 The Secretary of State also has a duty to inform the 
country from which funds are being withheld and assist that country 
in bringing responsible members of that country to justice.172 
Another piece of jurisprudence which applies to overseas 
confessions of a detained individual is the joint venture doctrine: “[t]he 
‘joint venture’ doctrine provides that ‘statements elicited during 
overseas interrogation by foreign police in the absence of Miranda 
warnings must be suppressed whenever United States law enforcement 
agents actively participate in questioning conducted by foreign 
authorities.’”173 In United States v. Abu Ali, the defendant, an American 
citizen, was detained and interrogated in Saudi Arabia by that 
                                                 
 166 Id. at § 362(a)(2). 
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government’s law enforcement in connection with Al-Qaeda 
activity.174 When the Saudi authorities learned that the defendant was 
an American citizen who was planning terror attacks in the U.S., the 
FBI was alerted175 but was denied access to the defendant.176 However, 
Saudi officials allowed the FBI to watch the interrogation of defendant 
through a one-way mirror.177 During the interrogation, Saudi officials 
asked the defendant six questions (among others) from a list of 
questions supplied by the FBI.178 Eventually, the defendant was turned 
over to U.S. authorities and was flown back to the United States to 
face criminal charges.179 In his appeal, defendant claimed that his 
statements made to Saudi authorities should be suppressed because he 
did not receive Miranda warnings, that his “interrogation constituted a 
‘joint venture’ between his Saudi interrogators and United States law 
enforcement officers, and his Saudi interrogators acted as the agents 
of United States law enforcement. . . .”180 The court held that the 
interrogation could not be considered a “joint venture” because U.S. 
law enforcement officials must have an “active” or “substantial” role 
of participation.181 The court stated that “mere presence at an 
interrogation does not constitute the ‘active’ or ‘substantial’ 
participation necessary for a ‘joint venture,’ . . . but coordination and 
direction of an investigation or interrogation does. . . .”182 
                                                 
 174 Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 224. 
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B. International Legal Authority 
When it comes to detention and interrogation, there are two 
separate international legal paradigms: jus in bello and international 
human rights law (IHRL). Jus in bello, or international humanitarian law 
(IHL), are the international laws, rules, customs, and norms that 
govern the conduct of parties (state and non-state actors) in armed 
conflicts of an international or non-international character.183 IHRL 
are the rules, norms, and customs that govern how parties are 
supposed to treat individual persons within their jurisdiction or 
territory.184 
Before IHL may be applied to a situation, an armed conflict 
must be determined to exist.185 “[A]n armed conflict exists whenever 
there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed 
violence between governmental authorities and organized armed 
groups or between such groups within a State.”186 Once an armed 
conflict exists, IHL becomes the applicable legal paradigm that 
governs the conduct of the conflicting parties.187 The four Geneva 
Conventions and the two Additional Protocols are the main treaties 
that deal with the law applicable to situations of armed conflict.188 The 
four Geneva Conventions, developed shortly after World War II, 
established a network of laws governing the conduct of international 
and non-international armed conflict.189 These treaties were 
established in an effort to “limit the suffering of combatants and 
                                                 
 183 See DYCUS, supra note 13, at 277. 
 184 Id. at 278. 
 185 Id. at 279. 
 186 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion 
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former 
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). 
 187 See Dycus, supra note 13, at 278–79. 
 188 Geneva Convention I, supra note 10; Geneva Convention II, supra note 
10; Geneva Convention III, supra note 10; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 10; 
Additional Protocol I, supra note 10; Additional Protocol II, supra note 10. The 
United States is not a party to Additional Protocol I or II. See Dycus, supra note 13, 
at 278. However, the United States does recognize significant portions of both 
Protocols as customary international law. See DYCUS, supra note 13, at 278. 
 189 See DYCUS, supra note 13, at 278. 
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noncombatants alike. . . .”190 All four Geneva Conventions contain 
two articles that are the same throughout: Common Article 2 and 
Common Article 3.191 Under these two Common Articles, every armed 
conflict is either international or non-international.192 Common Article 
2 defines when a conflict is international in character.193 It states that: 
 [T]he present Convention shall apply to all cases of 
declared war or of any other armed conflict which may 
arise between two or more of the High Contracting 
Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by 
one of them. The Convention shall also apply to all 
cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a 
High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation 
meets with no armed resistance.194 
Common Article 3 defines when a conflict is not of an 
international character.195 When a State and non-state actor enter into 
an armed conflict with one another, Common Article 3 applies.196 
Under the Geneva Conventions, when a conflict is of a non-
international character, only the rules prescribed in Common Article 3 
apply.197 
                                                 
 190 Id. at 277. 
 191 Geneva Convention I, supra note 10, art. 2, 3; Geneva Convention II, 
supra note 10, art 2, 3; Geneva Convention III, supra note 10, art. 2, 3; Geneva 
Convention IV, supra note 10, art 2, 3. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Geneva Convention I, supra note 10, art. 2; Geneva Convention II, supra 
note 10, art 2; Geneva Convention III, supra note 10, art. 2; Geneva Convention IV, 
supra note 10, art 2. 
 194 Id. 
 195 See Geneva Convention I, supra note 10, art. 3; Geneva Convention II, 
supra note 10, art 3; Geneva Convention III, supra note 10, art. 3; Geneva Convention 
IV, supra note 10, art 3. 
 196 See id. See generally Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, COMMENTARY: IV 
GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN 
TIME OF WAR (Oscar M. Uhler et al. eds., 1958). 
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In an armed conflict, an individual can be classified in only one 
of two ways: either combatant or non-combatant.198 In regard to 
detention laws today, in an international armed conflict between two 
states, the Third Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War (Third 
Geneva Convention) applies.199 In this type of conflict, if a High 
Contracting Party captures a member of the opposing High 
Contracting Party’s military, a combatant, that individual will be 
classified as Prisoner of War (POW).200 Additionally, if the detainee is 
a member of a non-military armed force that has a responsible 
command structure, wears a distinctive sign or uniform, openly carries 
arms, and operates within the laws and customs of war, that individual 
will be considered a lawful combatant and will be classified as a 
POW.201 Thus, the main difference between the combatant and non-
combatant classification is that upon capture, lawful combatants are 
afforded POW protections.202 If there is a question as to whether an 
individual will be classified as a POW, an Article 5 tribunal will be 
formed to determine the status of the detained individual.203 Once a 
detainee is classified as a POW, that individual entertains an array of 
rights afforded under the Third Geneva Convention, such as 
conditions of confinement and treatment.204 
If an individual is not classified as a combatant, then that 
person is deemed to be a non-combatant.205 The non-combatant 
classification largely refers to civilians in an international armed 
                                                 
 198 See SOLIS, supra note 110, at 222–23. 
 199 See generally Geneva Convention III, supra note 10. 
 200 Id. art. 4. 
 201 Id. 
 202 See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 10, art. 5. While a member of a 
state military or militia that meets the requirements set out above are the most routine 
examples of individuals who receive POW status upon capture, there are other 
situations in which a non-combatant would receive POW statues, such as persons 
who accompany the armed forces without being members thereof; merchant marine 
and civilian aircraft crews; levee en masse; and demobilized military personnel and 
military internees in neutral countries. Geneva Convention III, supra note 10, at art. 
4. 
 203 See Geneva Convention III, supra note 10, art. 5. 
 204 Id. 
 205 See SOLIS, supra note 110, at 223. 
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conflict.206 However, armed conflicts today are more than likely to be 
of a Common Article 3 non-international character and carried out 
between states and armed opposition groups.207 In this case, an 
“[a]rmed opposition group” can be defined as an “identifiable entit[y], 
with political objectives, that [it] pursue[s] by violent means, possessing 
an organized military force and an authority responsible for its acts.”208 
Members of an armed opposition group who are detained during a 
Common Article 3 non-international armed conflict are not afforded 
POW protections because no such protection exists under Common 
Article 3.209 However, Common Article 3 does give minimum 
standards of humane treatment afforded to individuals detained in 
non-international armed conflict.210 
In the Geneva Conventions and its Additional Protocols, 
torture is prohibited in Common Articles 3, 50, 51, 130, and 147; 
Article 75.2(ii) of Additional Protocol I; and Article 4.2(a) of 
Additional Protocol 2.211 Likewise, the Statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the Statute 
of the International Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) also prohibit 
                                                 
 206 See id. 
 207 See Upsala Conflict Data Program, DEPT. OF PEACE AND CONFLICT 
RESEARCH, https://ucdp.uu.se/#/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2019). 
 208 SOLIS, supra note 110, at 220. 
 209 See id. 
 210 Geneva Convention I, supra note 10, art. 3; Geneva Convention II, supra 
note 10, art. 3; Geneva Convention III, supra note 10, art. 3; Geneva Convention IV, 
supra note 10, art. 3 
(“[T]he following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place 
. . . a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel 
treatment and torture; b) taking of hostages; c) outrages upon personal dignity, in 
particular, humiliating and degrading treatment; d) the passing of sentences and the 
carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly 
constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as 
indispensable by civilized peoples. . . .”). 
 211 See Geneva Convention I, supra note 10, art. 3, 50, 51, 130, and 147; 
Geneva Convention II, supra note 10, art 3, 50, 51, 130, and 147; Geneva Convention 
III, supra note 10, art. 3, 50, 51, 130, and 147; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 10, 
art 3, 50, 51, 130, and 147; Additional Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 75.2(ii); 
Additional Protocol II, supra note 10, art. 4.2(a). 
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torture.212 Therefore, these provisions, along with state practice, signify 
a prohibition against torture as customary international law whether in 
international or non-international armed conflict. 
In addition to the Geneva Conventions, its Additional 
Protocols, and the ICTY and ICTR Statutes, the United Nations 
Convention against Torture (CAT) and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) correspondingly prohibit torture.213 However, 
the CAT and the UDHR are human rights conventions, not IHL 
treaties. Yet, torture is considered a jus cogens offense and states engaged 
in armed conflict are prohibited from subjecting detainees to torture.214 
Related to detainee torture and abuse in armed conflicts are 
extraordinary rendition and proxy detention. Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines extraordinary rendition as the “transfer, without formal 
charges, trial, or court approval, of a person suspected of being a 
terrorist or supporter of a terrorist group to a foreign country for 
imprisonment and interrogation on behalf of the transferring 
country.”215 In addition to there being no judicial process attended to 
the rendition, there is generally no extradition treaty between the states 
as well. Essentially, extraordinary rendition is seen as a tool in which 
countries can outsource torture and abusive interrogation 
techniques.216 
                                                 
 212 S.C. Res. 827, UN SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993); S.C. Res. 
955, UN SCOR 49th sess., 3453rd mtg, U.N. Doc S/Res/955 (1994). 
 213 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment. Annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. 
A/39/51 (1984); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 
217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), art. 5 (“No one shall be subjected to torture or 
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”). 
 214 See DYCUS, supra note 13, at 1011. Jus cogens is a preemptory norm of in 
international law in which states cannot opt out of the criminality of an offense. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATION LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 
(AM. LAW INST. 1986.). 
 215 Extraordinary Rendition, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 216 See generally David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition 
and the Torture Convention, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 585 (2006) (discussing extraordinary 
rendition as a violation of the Convention against Torture). 
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Proxy detention, on the other hand, may or may not involve 
extraordinary rendition.217 There is no agreed upon definition of proxy 
definition. However, proxy detention loosely refers to the detention of 
individuals by a state in which another state is in fact in control of said 
detention.218 However, proxy detention is not a “binary” situation; it is 
actually a spectrum of certain degrees of control, “influence,” and 
access.219 Extraordinary rendition can also be a form of proxy 
detention, but not always. Proxy detention refers to the effective 
control of one government’s detainees by another government, 
whereas extraordinary rendition refers to the transfer of a 
government’s detainees to the jurisdiction of another government.220 
Leading up to 9/11 and expanded afterwards, the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) operated extraordinary rendition 
programs.221 In these programs, the CIA would send detained terror 
suspects to countries such as Syria, Jordan, Morocco, Egypt, and 
Uzbekistan, each of which have less than stellar track records when it 
comes to the abuse and torture of detainees.222 As one U.S. official 
stated after 9/11, “‘[w]e don’t kick the [expletive] out of them. We send 
them to other countries so they can kick the [expletive] out of 
them.’”223 The U.S. defended its actions stating that it received 
assurances from the receiving government that transferred detainees 
would not be tortured or abused.224 
                                                 
 217 See Robert Chesney, Proxy Detention of a U.S. Citizen in Iraq? A Glimpse into 
a Murky but Important Category of Detention, Lawfare (Mar. 15, 2017, 10:56 AM), 
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 220 Id; Extraordinary Rendition, supra note 215. 
 221 See Michael Scheuer, A Fine Rendition, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/11/opinion/a-fine-rendition.html. 
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WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 26, 2002), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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While the term complicity does not “exist in the current 
terminology of the law of international responsibility,” there are 
corollaries in customary international law.225 The Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts was created 
by the United Nation’s International Law Commission and adopted in 
2001 by resolution 53/86.226 The Articles state that in international law, 
either in an armed conflict or otherwise, for the actions of a state or 
entity to be attributable to another state, the latter state must exercise 
a certain degree of control over the former state or entity.227 However, 
under Article 16, a state could be held responsible if it is connected 
with a wrongful act of another state.228 While Article 16 does not use 
the term complicity, it says that a “[s]tate which aids or assists another 
[s]tate in the commission of an international wrongful act by the latter 
is internationally responsible” if two conditions are met.229 First, the 
state must have “knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally 
wrongful act.”230 Second, the “act would be internationally wrongful if 
committed by the state.”231 In Application of the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Court recognized that this 
provision reflects customary international law.232 Additionally, two 
different, but similar tests have been proffered by international courts: 
the effective control test set out in Nicaragua v. United States of America, 
and the overall control test set out in Prosecutor v. Tadic.233 
In the Nicaragua case, Nicaragua alleged that the United States 
was engaged in aggression via giving aid and support to the Contras, 
                                                 
 225 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgement, 
2007 I.C.J. 43, 217 ¶ 419 (Feb. 26) [hereinafter Application]. 
 226 See Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Comm. on Chapter 
II, Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, annexed to U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (2001). 
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 228 See id. at art. 16. 
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 230 Id. at art. 16(a). 
 231 Id. at art. 16(b). 
 232 See Application, supra note 225 at 217 ¶ 419. 
 233 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), Judgement, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 64–65 ¶ 115 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua]; 
Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, ¶ 120 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For 
the Former Yugoslavia Jul. 15, 1999) [hereinafter Prosecutor]. 
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an armed opposition group in Nicaragua.234 The U.S. was, in fact, 
giving aid and support to the Contras; first covertly, but then publicly 
acknowledged by the Reagan Administration.235 The question before 
the International Court of Justice was: 
[w]hether or not the relationship of the contras to the 
United States Government was so much one of 
dependence on the one side and control on the other 
that it would be right to equate the contras, for legal 
purposes, with an organ of the United States 
Government, or as acting on behalf of that 
Government. . . .236 
The Court stated that there was no evidence that the U.S. 
“‘created’ the contra force” or that the U.S. gave “‘direct and critical 
combat support[,]’” even though the U.S. did fund, train, equip, and 
organize the Contras.237 The Court held that even though the U.S. did 
exert general control over the contras, which formed a high degree of 
dependency, it did not suffice to show that the contras were “directed 
or enforced” by the U.S. to the perpetration of acts conducted by the 
contras.238 In articulation of the effective control test, the court stated 
that for the “conduct to give rise to legal responsibility of the United 
States, it would in principle have to be proved that that State had 
effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course 
of which the alleged violations were committed.”239 
                                                 
 234 Specifically, Nicaragua alleged that the U.S. had recruited, trained, armed, 
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 236 See Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, at 62 ¶ 109. 
 237 Id. at 61–62 ¶ 108. 
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Similar applications of the effective control test were applied 
in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo and in Application 
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide.240 In Armed Activities, the Court held that for a state to be 
held legally responsible for the acts of another state or entity the 
conduct of the latter was “‘on the instructions of, or under the 
direction or control of’” the former.241 The Court in Application 
articulated the rule a bit differently, albeit principally the same, stating 
that a finding of state responsibility must be based on those individuals 
committing such violation to be in a “relationship of such complete 
dependence on the State that they cannot be considered otherwise than 
as organs of the State, so that all their actions performed in such 
capacity would be attributable to the State for purposes of international 
responsibility.”242 Both of these cases rely on the effective control test 
established in Nicaragua. 
In applying the effective control test, the Court in Armed 
Activity and Application both relied on similar language to determine 
whether or not the organization that perpetrated the violations could 
be considered an “organ” of another state.243 Moreover, the effective 
control test applies not only to actions of governments or 
organizations which could be imputable to another state, but also to 
the actions of individuals.244 To rise to that level of legal responsibility, 
the effective control test sets a high bar for a state to be attributable 
for the actions of another state or organization.245 
While the effective control test is one way to attribute legal 
responsibility, the Court in Prosecutor v. Tadić, provided a slightly 
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different standard by applying the “overall control” test.246 There, the 
Court stated that “[i]n order to attribute the acts of a military or 
paramilitary group to a State, it must be proved that the State wields 
overall control over the group, not only by equipping and financing 
the group, but also by coordinating or helping in the general planning 
of its military activity.”247 The Court in Tadić did recognize the effective 
control test established in Nicaragua, however, only as applied to 
private individuals acting on behalf.248 Additionally, a showing that a 
state directed another state or entity to commit specific illegals acts is 
not required in order to meet the overall control test.249 
As shown, there are some marked differences between the 
effective control test established in Nicaragua and the overall control 
test established in Tadić.250 In Application, the court considered the 
overall control test that the Tadić court established.251 It rejected the 
overall control test on two grounds: first, the ICTY “addressed an issue 
which was not indispensable for the exercise of its jurisdiction,” and 
second, that the overall control test was “unpersuasive” in determining 
the legal responsibility attributable to a state.252 In determining that the 
test was unpersuasive, the court stated that factual issues of the level 
of a state’s involvement in an armed conflict and their degree of 
control over a party to that conflict may differ.253 Additionally, the 
court noted that the overall control test is overly broad in determining 
when a state is legally responsible for the acts of another state or 
organization.254 The court reasoned that the overall control test 
“stretches too far, almost to breaking point, the connection which 
must exist between the conduct of a State’s organs and its international 
responsibility.”255 
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 249 Id. at ¶ 131. 
 250 See generally Antonio Cassese, The Nicaragua and Tadić Tests Revisited in 
Light of the ICJ Judgement on Genocide in Bosnia, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 649 (2007). 
 251 Application, 2007 I.C.J. 43, at 210 ¶ 404–05. 
 252 Id. at 209–11 ¶ 403–07. 
 253 Id. at 210 ¶ 405. 
 254 Id. at ¶ 406. 
 255 Id. 
2019 It's Dark and Hell is Hot 7:2 
481 
III. LIABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES 
A. Domestic Liability 
Could a U.S. official or officials, who knew of or witnessed 
such abuse or torture; presented the interrogators with questions to 
ask; interrogated detainees after torture or abuse sessions; or acted on 
intelligence derived from such torture sessions; be found criminally or 
civilly liable under U.S. federal law; if a detainee or group of detainees; 
being held and controlled by a foreign government or entity; is 
subjected to abuse or torture? In short, the answer is no. In assessing 
whether a U.S. official could be found criminally liable under U.S. 
federal law, there are two key factors to consider: the actions of U.S. 
officials and the relationship of the U.S. officials to the detainee or 
detainees. The first factor, the actions of U.S. officials, contain a mens 
rea and actus reus element in order to fulfill statutory requirements. 
Application of these factors to the case at hand reveals that 
there has been no violation of U.S. law. In the first instance, there were 
no allegations that U.S. officials engaged in abuse or torture of 
detainees, thus, not satisfying the actus reus element. At most, U.S. 
officials either were present during torture or abuse, interrogated 
detainees after torture was conducted, or both. In this regard, U.S. 
officials have not violated any domestic law regarding detention, abuse, 
or torture. Because U.S. officials have not engaged in any acts of 
torture or abuse, there can be no violation of a torture statute. 
Secondly, and arguably most important, the detainees are under 
complete and total control of a foreign government. E.O. 13,491 states 
explicitly that interrogation techniques and detention practices only 
apply to individuals in “the custody or under the effective control” of 
the U.S. or detained in a “facility owned, operated, or controlled” by 
the U.S.256 The E.O. reiterates what is stated in the DTA, WCA, and 
Torture Act. Clearly, neither torture nor abuse or the custody and 
control of the detainees has been satisfied. Lacking these two elements, 
U.S. officials could not be federally indicted for the torture and abuse 
of detainees in black sites in Southern Yemen. 
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If the U.S. were to attempt to extradite an individual from these 
facilities to the U.S. to face criminal charges, the U.S. would have to 
make certain that any information used against that individual at trial 
would be gathered under lawful U.S. jurisprudential means. Admitting 
statements made to U.S. officials during a post-torture interrogation 
would be very difficult to have submitted as evidence at trial. 
Even though the “joint venture” doctrine is used to suppress 
statements given by a defendant when not properly mirandized, the 
doctrine could be used to establish culpability of U.S. officials in the 
torture and abuse of detainees at the hands of foreign officials. The 
“joint venture” doctrine states that “mere presence at an interrogation 
does not constitute the ‘active’ or ‘substantial’ participation necessary 
for a ‘joint venture,’ . . . but coordination and direction of an 
investigation and interrogation does.”257 Therefore, if the facts show 
that U.S. officials coordinated and directed the torture and abuse of 
detainees, even if the facilities and detainees were under the exclusive 
control of a foreign government, the relationship could be considered 
a “joint venture.” But what then constitutes coordination and 
direction? At what point has a U.S. official met the threshold of 
coordinating and directing torture and abuse? If providing questions 
and being present at such sessions, as was the case in Abu Ali, does 
not meet that threshold then what does? Would giving UAE and 
Yemini military a list of names of people to be detained count as 
coordination and direction? Case law has yet to address these issues. 
Even if the “joint venture” doctrine was a viable legal 
alternative, there are numerous issues to consider when establishing a 
prosecutable case against U.S. officials. For one, fact finding would be 
extremely difficult. To prove probable cause to a grand jury that the 
abuse and torture of detainees abroad by another government could 
be considered a “joint venture” with U.S. officials would be tenuous. 
Additionally, if the Department of Justice indicted U.S. officials on 
“joint venture” torture and abuse charges, it would be an implicit 
statement that the U.S is complicit in abuse and torture. In the case at 
hand, there are not sufficient amount of facts to consider the 
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relationship between the U.S. and the UAE and Yemeni interrogators 
as a “joint venture.” 
Even if U.S. officials were in violation of a torture law in the 
U.S., it is extremely unlikely that any individuals would even be brought 
up on charges. Following 9/11 but shortly before the invasion of Iraq, 
the Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel produced a 
memorandum outlining the standards of conduct required by U.S. law 
enforcement personnel under the CAT.258 Infamously known as the 
“Bybee memo,”259 it defined torture so narrowly that, in effect, no U.S. 
law enforcement personnel could ever be convicted of torture in the 
U.S.260 The Bybee memo, however, did not apply to military 
personnel.261 Two years later, the memo was withdrawn.262 
Shortly thereafter in March of 2003, John Yoo authored 
another memo outlining the limits of interrogations carried out against 
unlawful combatants by the military.263 In sum, the memo proclaimed 
“that federal laws prohibiting assault, maiming and other crimes did 
not apply to military interrogators who questioned al-Qaeda captives 
because the president’s ultimate authority as commander in chief 
overrode such statutes.”264 This memo did not last long either; “[n]ine 
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months later . . . th[e] memo was withdrawn by a new head of the 
OLC. . . .”265 
In hindsight, there is no question that the United States 
engaged in abuse, torture, and extraordinary rendition of detainees 
during the Bush Administration’s prosecution of the Global War on 
Terror.266 President Obama admitted to it when he stated that “‘[w]e 
tortured some folks,’. . . . ‘We did some things that were contrary to 
our values.’”267 The abuses at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, the CIA’s 
black site detention facilities, and the use of extraordinary rendition as 
a means of proxy detention have all been well chronicled and reported 
on.268 What is clear is that the abuse and torture of detainees held by 
the U.S. were not isolated incidents; rather, the U.S. embarked on an 
official policy that was inconsistent with domestic and international 
law.269 This begs the question: how many individuals have been 
federally indicted under the various U.S. torture laws from the abuses 
and torture at Abu Ghraib, the CIA black site detention facilities, and 
the extraordinary rendition program? 
In regard to the CIA’s treatment of detainees, only one civilian, 
David Passaro, has been charged after 9/11.270 Passaro, a CIA 
contractor at the time, was not even convicted under U.S. anti-torture 
laws, but felony assault.271 Eleven U.S. soldiers faced Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (UCMJ) actions related to the Abu Ghraib prison 
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abuses.272 However, these were UCMJ actions and not federal charges. 
273 Of important note, no high-ranking commanders of the Abu 
Ghraib prison faced formal charges.274 This gap shows that there is a 
huge discrepancy in accountability of individuals who carried out abuse 
and torture against detainees. 
B. International Liability 
Before the liability of the U.S. can be determined, the type of 
armed conflict it is participating in must be clarified. Currently, the U.S. 
is engaged in an armed conflict with against ISIS-Y and AQAP in 
Yemen.275 Since ISIS-Y and AQAP are armed opposition groups 
operating in Yemen, this is a non-international armed conflict. 
Therefore, IHL legal principles apply to the U.S. in its conduct against 
ISIS-Y and AQAP. Further, there is a non-international armed conflict 
between the states that make up the Saudi-led coalition and the 
Houthis in Yemen.276 
The U.S. cannot be held liable for the jus in bello violations of 
other nations. Nor can the U.S. be held liable for every jus in bello 
violation of its allies. There is no doubt that, if the allegations of torture 
and abuse by the UAE and Yemen are true, both countries would be 
in violation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the 
numerous other prohibitions on abuse and torture. Yet, the question 
remains; at what point is the U.S. liable for the jus in bello violations of 
a third party? Issues such as proxy detention and extraordinary 
rendition are not black and white. Rather, they exist on a spectrum. 
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So, where does the U.S. in relation to UAE and Yemen fall on 
this spectrum? In the light of this question, one must turn to the 
“effective control” test established in Nicaragua. Was the relationship 
between the UAE and Yemeni interrogators and the U.S. one of 
effective control? Can the actions of UAE and Yemen be attributable 
to the U.S.? The role of each country in Yemen is not mutually 
exclusive. Yemen, UAE, and the U.S. are all in non-international armed 
conflicts with Al-Qaeda and ISIL-Y.277 However, Yemen and the UAE 
are also in a non-international armed conflict with the Houthis, which 
the U.S. supports through the Saudi-led coalition by the sale of arms 
to coalition countries and limited intelligence sharing.278 Additionally, 
the detention facilities in Southern Yemen are financed and ran by the 
UAE and Yemen.279 Moreover, this is not a case of extraordinary 
rendition or proxy detention. At no point has the U.S. been in control 
of the detainees in Southern Yemen. 
Under the “effective control” test, it would “have to be proved 
that [the U.S.] had effective control of the military . . . operations in 
the course of which the alleged violations were committed.”280 
Effective control goes beyond arming, financing, and sharing 
intelligence.281 The degree of control required would be that of being 
able to equate the actions of UAE and Yemeni interrogators as organs 
of the U.S. government. In this case, there are not sufficient facts to 
show that the UAE and Yemen, which are members of the Saudi-led 
coalition, are in fact under effective control of the U.S. government. 
Even under the more broad “overall control” test used in Tadić, it 
would still be difficult to argue that UAE and Yemeni interrogators 
were under the overall control of the U.S. Therefore, in considering 
applicable jus in bello principles, the U.S. government would not be 
found liable for the torture and abuse perpetrated by UAE and Yemen 
because those countries’ facilities, detainees, and interrogators were 
not under the effective or overall control of the U.S. government. 
Further, there are no allegations that the U.S. aided or assisted UAE in 
their black site detention program. If it could be proven that the U.S. 
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did aid or assist the UAE, then it might open itself up to liability. 
However, it is far from unlikely that will occur. 
What if the U.S. executed a drone strike against an Al-Qaeda 
operative based on intelligence gathered from an individual who was 
abused or tortured by the UAE or Yemen? This situation is largely 
contextual. If the U.S. based its justification for the strike purely from 
intelligence gathered from an abused or tortured individual, then the 
U.S. is likely in violation Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol I, 
Article 57(2)(a), precaution in attack.282 While the U.S. has not ratified 
Additional Protocol I, it does regard Article 57(2)(a) as customary 
international law.283 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Indeed, the issues raised by the Associated Press article are 
troubling. Given the U.S.’s history of torture and abuse during the 
Global War on Terror, the last thing the U.S. should be doing is 
associating itself with such behavior. Even if the allegations raised in 
the article are untrue, the U.S. would benefit greatly from a formalized 
policy that addresses the issues of U.S. allies engaging in gross 
violations of international law. The benefits of an explicit, formalized 
policy would be immense. Not only should the U.S. clarify its stance 
regarding torture and abuse by allies, it should be an active participant 
in the prevention and termination of battlefield torture and abuse. 
Actions, however, speak much louder than words. Therefore, 
U.S. action that attempts to end torture would go much farther than 
official statements. To start, the U.S. needs to hold its own citizens 
accountable for their actions in violation of the law. The lack of 
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accountability that the U.S. has imposed on its own citizens for the 
torture and abuse committed during the Global War on Terror is 
troubling in the least and appalling at best. As more time passes, these 
incidents will only fall deeper into the recesses of the public 
conscience. 
The challenges posed by national security in the present day 
cannot be understated. Threats against America continue to evolve as 
their complexities increase. Non-state actors and terror groups pose a 
great threat against the U.S. The federal government and policymakers 
are under continuous pressure, both internally and externally, to 
prevent a large-scale terror attack on U.S. soil. This pressure makes it 
more likely that policymakers and those who execute the policy will 
continue to push the boundaries of international and domestic law. 
Finding the balance between national security and the law is no easy 
feat. Yet, citizens should constantly demand that policymakers and 
legislators act in accordance with the country’s highest moral and 
ethical values. 
 
